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Abstract 
 
The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) constrains industrial polluters to buy/sell CO2 
allowances depending on a regional depolluting objective of -8% of CO2 emissions by 2012 
compared to 1990 levels. Companies may also buy carbon offsets from developing countries, 
funding emissions cuts there instead, under a Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). This article critically analyzes the price relationships in the EU emissions trading 
system. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) delivers 
credits that may be used by European companies for their compliance needs. Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs) from CDM projects are credits flowing into the global 
compliance market generated through emission reductions. EUAs (EU Allowances) are the 
tradable unit under the EU ETS. Besides, the EU Linking Directive allows the import for 
compliance into the EU ETS up to 13.4% of CERs on average. This article details the 
idiosyncratic risks affecting each emissions market, be it in terms of regulatory uncertainty, 
economic activity, industrial structure, or the impact of other energy markets. Besides, based 
on a careful analysis of the EUA and CER price paths, we assess common risk factors by 
focusing more particularly on the role played by the CER import limit within the ETS.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the EU's flagship climate policy, forcing 
industrial polluters to buy/sell CO2 allowances above a pre-specified emissions cap. 
Companies may cut the costs imposed on the industry by buying relatively cheaper carbon 
offsets from developing countries, funding emissions cuts there instead, under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). As the latest Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) report pointed out the huge potential for the growth of CO2 
emissions and associated pollutants in non-Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol, this 
article critically analyses to what extent the link between the EU ETS and the CDM will 
contribute to cut CO2 emissions by 2020.  
According to the article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, projects under the Clean 
Development Mechanism consist in achieving greenhouse gases emissions reduction in non-
Annex B countries. After validation, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) delivers credits that may be used by Annex B countries for use towards 
their compliance position. Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) from CDM projects are 
credits flowing into the global compliance market generated through emission reductions. 
EUAs (EU Allowances) are the tradable units under the EU ETS. Albeit being determined on 
distinct emissions markets, CERs and EUAs may be exchanged based on their representative 
trading unit. One CER is equal to one ton of CO2-equivalent emissions reduction, while one 
EUA is equal to one ton of CO2 emitted in the atmosphere.  
Besides, the EU Linking Directive2 allows the import of CERs into the EU ETS up to 
13.4% of their compliance needs on average. The import limit is equal to 1.7 billion tonnes of 
offsets being allowed into the EU ETS from 2008-2020, that is, an absolute maximum of 
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50% of the depolluting effort fixed by the scheme will be achievable through the CDM. 
Overall, our results shed light on the importance of the link between the EU ETS and the 
CDM to foster investments in infrastructure technology in developing countries, thereby 
facilitating the transition to a low-carbon future. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, we detail the idiosyncratic 
risks affecting each emissions market, be it in terms of regulatory uncertainty or economic 
factors. Second, based on a careful analysis of the EUA and CER price paths, we assess 
common risk factors by focusing more particularly on the role played by the CER import 
limit within the EU ETS.  
 
 
II. IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKS 
 
In this section, we comment first on the price developments of EUAs and CERs. 
Second, we examine the idiosyncratic risk factors for each emissions market. 
 
1. Price development 
 
Primary CERs (pCERs) have a delivery risk, while secondary CERs (sCERs) are 
already generated and issued by the CDM Executive Board, and are hence risk-free. The risks 
attached to primary CERs are linked to the United Nations’  “International Transaction Log” 
(ITL) connection, the import limit, and the performance for operating projects, to which we 
may add a high volume of registered projects, as well as registration and methodological risks 
for proposed projects. The risks attached to secondary CERs are the ITL connection, the 
import limit, and eligibility criteria to be met for transfer of a CER from one EU registry to 
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another.  In the exchange contract (sCER), the seller agrees to pay EUAs or cash in case of 
non-delivery. 
 
Figure 1: EUA, CER, and EUA-CER Spread Prices 
 
Source: European Climate Exchange 
 
The CER and EUA price series in Figure 1 shows that we are in presence of 
correlated emissions markets. The CER-EUA spread presented at the bottom of Figure 1 
represents arbitrage opportunities for traders who are able to identify pricing anomalies 
between the quoted spread price and the two emissions markets.3 The EUA spread over the 
secondary CER widened to nearly €10 in Figure 1, and was even higher for most primary 
CER contracts. We may also observe that the CER-EUA spread varies in the range of €-1.5 
on 20 November 2008, and has been as high as €-9 during 2008. A broad spread means that 
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there is a high risk premium in the purchase of CERs compared to EUAs. At the same time, it 
means that there are large arbitrage opportunities to use CERs for compliance within the EU 
ETS, since they are a lot cheaper than EUAs. A narrow CER-EUA spread could also mean 
lower demand for CERs, which may discourage project developers from investing in cleaner 
energy facilities.  
This analysis brings us to investigate the respective risk factors of CERs and EUAs.  
 
2. Risk factors specific to CDM credits 
 
CDM projects add value to an investment through CER revenues. CDM projects are 
registered by the CDM Executive Board, and displayed in the CDM pipeline4 along the 
several steps from registration to validation. One particularly striking source of uncertainty 
concerning the validation of CDM projects lies in the so-called “additionality” of GHG 
emissions reductions claimed; that is, project developers need to demonstrate the GHG 
emissions reductions claimed would not have been achieved in the absence of the project. 
According to the World Bank (2008), the CDM projects’ distribution is skewed toward a 
small group of developing host countries: five countries (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South 
Korea) concentrate around 80% of the total project pipeline. These countries have been able 
to streamline their CDM project identification and approval procedures at an early stage. 
Moreover, these countries offered several large-scale project opportunities which are 
generally attractive as they enable investors to spread project transaction costs across a larger 
number of CERs. Most projects are in the category of renewable energy and biomass energy 
production: 26% of CDM projects involve hydropower technology, 15% biomass-based 
energy production, and 14% wind energy. China concentrates 66% of hydropower projects, 
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and India 68% of biomass energy projects. Together, those countries host 90% of wind 
energy projects. With such a geographic concentration, CER prices are sensitive to a large 
inflow of validated credits (e.g. from China or India).5  
The risk factors specific to primary and secondary CERs are as follows. On the 
primary market, there needs to be (i) an increased predictability of issuance and frequency of 
transfer CERs by the CDM EB, (ii) an ITL operational and linked to the EU registry system, 
and (iii) the development of a robust options market. On the secondary market, we need to 
accound for (i) the acceptance into EU registries of CDM credits, (ii) the development of new 
emissions trading schemes which increase sCER demand and thus push CER prices to 
converge with other carbon prices under compliance schemes, and (iii) limitations on the use 
of CERs compliance under the EU ETS. Finally, both pCERs and sCERs are affected by the 
uncertainties concerning the post-2012 climate regime.  
 
3. Risk factors specific the European carbon market 
 
There are three main sources of risk in the EU ETS. First, the free permits distributed 
to existing firms on a ‘‘first-come, first-served’’ basis represent a market value of €40 billion 
that was created at the same time as CO2 emissions were capped. This allocation 
methodology is also known as grandfathering. Since 1 January 2005, carbon allowances form 
another asset in commodities against which industrials and brokers need to hedge. As the 
volume of transaction on the EU ETS has increased steadily from 262 million tons in 2005 to 
1,443 million tons in 2007, this trading activity reflects market participants’ progressive 
learning of this new financial market.  
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Second, during Phase I of the EU ETS (2005–2007), EUAs experienced a high level 
of volatility around each compliance event. Industrial installations have the obligation to 
surrender to the EC the exact number of allowances that matches their verified emissions 
each year around end of March. The official report by the European Commission is disclosed 
by mid-May, but installation operators have already a fair amount of information between the 
publication of their own report and the compilation of verified emissions by the European 
Commission to approximate the total level of emissions relative to allowances allocated and 
to adjust their anticipations6. 
Third, installations do not need to physically hold allowances during the year to 
produce, but only to match the required number of allowances with verified emissions for 
their yearly compliance report to the European Commission. Consequently, the probability of 
a potential illiquidity trap exists if market participants face a market squeeze during the 
compliance event. Another specificity of emission allowances may be highlighted: compared 
to stocks which are valid during the entire lifetime of the firm, emission allowances are 
vintaged for a given compliance year and cannot be used for future compliance periods, 
unless intertemporal flexibility mechanisms are authorized. During Phase I of the EU ETS, 
the inter-period transfer of allowances has been restricted by all Member States (Alberola and 
Chevallier, 2009).  
 
 
III. COMMON RISK FACTORS 
 
Similarly, we may identify several common risk factors between EUAs and CERs. 
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1. The ITL-CITL connection 
 
On 19 October 2008 the European Commission’s “Community Independent 
Transaction Log” (CITL) connected to the United Nations’  “International Transaction Log” 
(ITL). The ITL-CITL connection involved the EU’s 27 Member States disconnecting their 
national registries, and re-connecting them to the ITL. Simultaneously, the CITL connected 
directly to the ITL. These operations allowed the delivery of sellers’ international credits 
from the Kyoto Protocol (such as CERs) into buyers’ EU national registries. Before that date, 
issued CERs remained in the UN CDM Registry, waiting for the connection with the EU 
registry to be completed.  
During Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012), the EU Commission has announced that 
the use of CERs by industrial installations will be capped at 270 million tons per year. For 
Phase III (2013-2020), the limit for existing installations will be 40 million tons per year. 
Altogether, Phase III CER imports will add up to 300 million tons. Thus, the post-2008 EU 
ETS CER import limit has been fixed at 1.7 billion tons.7 Therefore, the ITL-CITL 
connection has filled the risk factor common to CDM project developers and investors. First, 
it has provided stimulus to CER and EUA trading, as the barriers to transfer allowances 
between UN and EU registries have been removed. Second, it has offered to EU investors in 
CDM projects the possibility to monetize their assets, by using CERs towards their own 
compliance or by exchanging them on the European market as secondary CERs. However, it 
seems worth noting that some types of CERs credits are restricted from use in the EU ETS, 
such as Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) projects.  
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2. The import limit of CERs within the EU emissions trading system 
 
Since the ITL-CITL connection, Kyoto credits may be imported into the EU ETS, and 
are valid for compliance up to 13.4% on average. As detailed in Section 2.1, the EUA-CER 
price arbitrage becomes possible up to that limit. Investors will maximize their profits by 
buying the maximum volume of CERs allowed for compliance and selling the same amount 
EUAs when the EUA-CER spread is at its maximum, i.e. in the range of €6 to €9. Alberola et 
al. (2010) provide a detailed analysis of the determinants of EUA and CER prices. Besides, 
they study the determinants of the EUA-CER spread with regard to market microstructure 
mechanisms (such as the volume of allowances exchanged, etc). 
 Concerning the role played by the CER import limit for compliance within the EU 
trading system, we may proceed with the following counter-factual exercise. Eighty million 
tons of CERs have been used for compliance to cover verified emissions in 2008 (according 
to the EU Commission).8 At the same time, 250 million tons of CERs have been issued 
(according to the CDM Pipeline). If we assume the CER issuance rate to be constant,9 we 
obtain the path for the stock of CERs available for compliance within the EU ETS over time 
as depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: CER Stock available for EU ETS Compliance 
 
Source : Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts, from UNEP Risoe CDM Pipeline  
 
Figure 2 shows the path of CERs available for compliance in the EU ETS at time t 
during Phase II (2008-2012). The solid orange lines denote the stock of CERs available 
corrected for various issuance uncertainties, while the solid green lines indicate the total gross 
supply of CER issued. We observe on this graph that, due to technical and institutional 
constraints, firms could not use more than 1.6 Gt of CERs by April 2013 (Trotignon and 
Leguet (2009)). Besides, the yearly CER import limit does not seem to be binding before the 
2010 compliance event.10 The path of CER delivery displayed in Figure 2 critically depends 
on the criteria for CDM project validation.  
In terms of expected CER delivery, HFC, PFC, CH4, and N2O emission-reduction 
projects have a relatively large market share, which is mainly due to these gases’ high global 
warming potential. It is also important to look at the distribution of projects and technologies 
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in terms of expected GHG emission reductions. Twenty-two projects involving HFC 
emissions reductions constitute 17% of expected emissions reductions by 2012.11 Sixty-five 
projects involving N2O emissions reductions constitute 9% of expected CERs12 (World Bank, 
2008). By contrast, the 1,098 hydro projects will deliver just 17% of expected CERs. The 
distribution of issued CERs issued by technology is important to keep in mind, since HFC- 
projects (and other gases for which CERs are heavily issued) may not allowed for import in 
the EU ETS towards Phase III. 
In terms of risk-assessment, it is also interesting to note that the delivery of credits, 
and thus the performance of projects, greatly varies: only 10 to 15% of methane reduction 
credits could be verified and therefore issued (World Bank, 2008). This ratio is 75% for HFC 
23 emissions reduction projects, while N2O projects sometimes deliver more CERs than 
expected. 
 
3. Uncertainties concerning Post-Kyoto agreements 
 
Of course, the list of common risk factors between the CDM and EU ETS markets 
would not be complete without a careful outlook of negotiations for a post-Kyoto treaty. 
The European Commission has underlined its will to wait for the outcome of the December 
2009 Copenhagen Summit before taking final decisions concerning CERs use in Phase III 
of the EU ETS (2013-2020). For instance, on technological grounds, CERs generated 
through HFC destruction or large hydro projects may be banned from import within the EU 
ETS. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This article critically examines the role played by Clean Development Mechanism 
projects for compliance into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. We have highlighted risk 
factors specific to each emissions market – additionality and predictability for CERs, 
grandfathering, compliance events and banking provisions for EUAs – as well as common 
risk factors – the ITL-CITL connection, the role played by the 1.7Gton import limit, and 
uncertainties concerning future international agreements on climate change. 
My conclusion cautions towards a prudent approach concerning the use of CERs for 
compliance within the EU trading system. On the one hand, CERs foster investments in non-
polluting technologies in non-Annex B countries. These project thereby contribute to the 
“global public good” of fighting climate change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions with a 
maximum potential (as for HFC destruction or large hydro projects) at lowest cost, and 
should be encouraged from both economic and environmental viewpoints. On the other hand, 
the unlimited use of CERs for compliance within the EU ETS would set a price floor for 
EUAs, and drive down their price. This solution does not appear compatible with the 
necessary “price signal” of emitting one ton of CO2 in the atmosphere in Europe, which 
should be high enough to provide incentives for industries to cut back emissions compared to 
their business-as-usual scenario.  
The bottom line is that the restricted use of CERs for compliance within the EU ETS 
appears a wise choice from the EU Commission’s viewpoint, in order 1) to limit design 
inefficiencies that have already affected the price path of EUAs during Phase I (2005-2007) 
and 2) to foster investments at the EU level in less CO2-intensive production processes.  
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